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Supporting or Resisting? 
The Relationship between Global North States and Special Procedures 
Rosa Freedman

 and Francois Crépeau 
 
I. Introduction 
Scrutiny of the relationship between Special Procedures and States typically focuses on 
mandate holders’ independence and expertise, as well as the impact of their work ‘on the 
ground’. Global South countries have been criticised for ignoring visit requests, resisting 
recommendations contained within reports and seeking to undermine Special Procedures by 
introducing new, vague mandates on subjects not traditionally viewed as falling within the 
human rights matrix. Little attention, however, has been paid to the relationship between 
Global North States and Special Procedures.  
Global North States
1
 have typically supported Special Procedures, both in terms of 
creating mandates and providing financial support for their activities. The initial mandates 
focussed on civil and political rights, a category which ties in with Western notions of how 
legal mechanisms may be utilised to protect and promote human rights. From the outset of 
thematic mandates, Global North States have been at the fore of sponsoring, promoting and 
voting for the creation and renewal of mandates,
2
 viewing Special Procedures as a crucial 
tool for promoting and protecting rights. Financial contributions to Special Procedures reflect 
the esteem with which Global North States hold mandates, with significant resources donated 
by many of those countries especially when compared with contributions from other States.
3
 
Moreover, until recently the mandate holders overwhelmingly were likely to come from 
Global North countries, either in terms of nationality or places of employment. While there 
                                                          

 This work was supported by the British Academy (grant number SG132479). 
1
 The division between Global North and Global South is typically defined along socio-economic lines, with 
frequent references to development indicators. Global North generally refers to countries from Western Europe, 
alongside some from Eastern Europe that are members of the European Union, North America and other more 
developed countries, such as Japan, Israel and South Africa. The division between South and North in this 
manner is not uncontentious, as indeed are similar divisions along regional or political lines, but is a useful 
(albeit limited) tool for understanding State interactions and engagement within the international arena. We 
argue in this chapter that there are clearly discernible patterns in State activities regarding Special Procedures 
that can be categorised along North-South lines and that it is important to focus on how some Global North 
States respond to some types of mandate holders in order to highlight and address those responses.   
2
 For more on this point see R Freedman and J Mchangama, ‘Expanding or Diluting Human Rights?: The 
Proliferation of United Nations Special Procedures Mandates’ (2016) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 1, 164-193.  
3
 For the most recent detailed breakdown of voluntary contributions given by States, including earmarked and 
unearmarked funds, see OHCHR, ‘Report 2014 - Funding’ (2015) available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/OHCHRReport2014/WEB_version/allegati/5_Funding_2014.pdf in particular 
68-73, accessed 3 April 2016. See also Connors’ chapter in this collection. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2775618 
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was always disproportionate scrutiny by mandate holders of Global North States,
4
 perhaps 
owing to a greater accessibility to those countries, until recently there was no more resistance 
to Special Procedures’ reports from such States than might be expected from any country that 
is criticised for its human rights record. 
The changing nature of some Global North States’ response and reaction to mandate 
holders’ visits and reports has developed since the turn of the Millennium and has picked up 
speed since the Human Rights Council’s creation in 2006. There have been a number of very 
public incidents where particular Global North countries have refused to allow mandate 
holders unfettered access to undertake their work or have reacted negatively, and frequently 
erroneously, to criticisms levelled in mandate holders’ reports. While this has not yet 
impacted upon Global North countries’ relationship with the Special Procedures system as a 
whole in terms of financial contributions
5
 or positive responses to visit requests, it is crucial 
to understand why those States are becoming increasingly resistant to some mandate holders.  
This chapter will interrogate the relationship between Global North countries and 
mandate holders, individually, and the system more broadly. It will first set out the ways in 
which Special Procedures uphold the nature of international human rights, particularly in 
relation to universality and to the interdependence, interrelatedness and indivisibility of 
human rights. It will then turn to the forms of resistance that a number of Global North States 
have taken regarding certain types of mandates, before exploring potential motivations and 
reasons for that resistance. Using four case studies – the UK and adequate housing, Canada 
and food, the EU and migrants, the US and poverty – we shall explore the ways in which 
some Global North States have resisted and undermined particular mandate holders’ 
activities. Analysis will focus on the reasons for that resistance, which challenge the principle 
of universality of human rights. In particular, we shall highlight the ideological divisions that 
remain, despite Global North States paying lip service to the indivisibility of human rights. 
As well, we shall document the increasingly frequent political attitude of a growing number 
of Global North States who insist that, considering their human rights record, they ought not 
to be visited and criticised by Special Procedures mandate holders, who should rather 
concentrate their energy on States with much worse human rights records. 
 
                                                          
4
 The statistics on country visits undertaken by mandate holders since 1998 are available on the OHCHR 
website <www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/countryvisitsa-e.aspx> accessed 3 April 2016 and 
demonstrate that the majority of thematic visits have been undertaken in Global North countries, despite those 
States comprising a significant minority of UN member States. 
5
 See (n 3) for statistics on voluntary contributions.  
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II. Special Procedures and the nature of human rights 
The role that the Special Procedures system plays in protecting and promoting human rights 
reflects a key principle of international human rights law that rights are (i) universal and (ii) 
interdependent, interrelated and indivisible.
6
 The role of Special Procedures in protecting and 
promoting all types of rights universally is one that sets it apart from the UN treaty bodies 
and from the regional human rights judicial and quasi-judicial institutions. Those mechanisms 
only focus on States parties to the relevant treaties (UN or regional) that are monitored, 
protected and promoted by those bodies. Special Procedures mandates, in contrast, may focus 
on any country and may report on or engage with a State even if a mandate holder has not 
visited its territory. Where it comes to subject matter covered by mandates, the Special 
Procedures system has a far broader and more inclusive remit than any other human rights 
bodies. Treaty bodies and regional institutions, for example, may only focus on those rights 
falling within specific treaties whereas the Special Procedures system is more fluid, allowing 
new mandates to be created to protect and promote any right. And since the 1990s the system 
has increasingly reflected all categories of thematic rights. But that expansion has also 
brought greater resistance from Global North States, and it is important therefore to explore 
the types of mandates and those countries’ responses to their creation before examining how 
some States have reacted to visits from mandate holders. 
   
A. Mandates and different categories of rights  
With the system developing ad hoc during the Cold War, Special Procedures did not always 
reflect the broad range of human rights within the international system. Indeed, the types of 
mandates have changed and expanded rapidly over the past 20 years. Special Procedures 
focussed almost exclusively on civil and political rights (CPR) until 1995 when the 
Commission on Human Rights created a third generation rights (TGR) mandate on Toxic 
Dumping.
7
 Since then, there has been a movement towards expanding the system to include 
                                                          
6
 See eg ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna 14–25 
June 1993) (12 July 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23, para 5: ‘All human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and 
equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of 
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.’  
7
 UNCHR Res 1995/81 ‘The Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement and Dumping of Toxic and Dangerous 
Products and Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human Rights’ (8 March 1995) UN Doc E/CN.4/1995/176.  
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economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) and TGR, adding some 12 ESCR mandates
8
 and 
four TGR mandates.
9
 The first two ESCR mandates were on Poverty
10
 and Education,
11
 both 
created in 1998. Between 1995 and 2013, five TGR mandates and 12 ESCR mandates have 
been adopted.  In that time there have been four new CPR as traditionally understood,
12
 
starting with Impunity in 2004.
13
 There have also been eight mandates,
14
 starting with 
Migrants in 1999,
15
 where the resolution largely seeks to promote and protect CPR but only 
in relation to a specific or vulnerable group of people.  
It is this expansion of the system that has both given greater legitimacy and credibility 
to Special Procedures but has also impacted upon the ways in which some Global North 
                                                          
8
 UNCHR Res 1998/25 ‘Human Rights and Extreme Poverty’ (17 April 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/25; 
UNCHR Res 1998/33 ‘Right to Education’ (17 April 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/33; UNCHR Res 2000/9 
‘Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living’ (17 April 2000) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2000/9; UNCHR Res 2000/10 ‘Right to Food’ (17 April 2000) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2000/10; UNCHR 
Res 2000/82 ‘The Effects of Structural Adjustment Policies and Foreign Debt’ (26 April 2000) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2000/82; UNCHR Res 2001/30 ‘Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (20 April 2001) UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/30; UNCHR Res 2002/31 ‘Right 
of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health’ (22 April 
2002) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2002/31; UNCHR Res 2002/68 ‘People of African Descent’ (25 April 2002) UN 
Doc E/CN.4/RES/2002/68; UNCHR Res 2005/69 ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises’ (20 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/69; UNHRC Res 7/22, ‘Human Rights Obligations 
related to Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation’ (28 March 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/7/22; UNHRC 
Res 10/23 ‘Cultural Rights’ (26 March 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/10/23; UNHRC Res 24/20 ‘The Human 
Rights of Older Persons’ (27 September 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/24/20.  
9
 UNCHR Res 1998/72 ‘Right to Development’ (22 April 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/72; UNCHR Res 
2005/55 ‘Human Rights and International Solidarity’ (20 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/55; UNCHR Res 
2005/57 ‘Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order’ (20 April 2005) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2005/57; UNHRC Res 19/10 ‘Human Rights Obligations related to the Enjoyment of a Safe, 
Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment’ (22 March 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/19/10. 
10
 UNCHR Res 1998/25 ‘Human Rights and Extreme Poverty’ (17 April 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/25. While 
this Resolution refers to human rights generally, the strong connections between poverty and ESCR enjoyment 
(or lack thereof) means that this mandate can legitimately be labelled ‘ESCR’ in nature. 
11
 UNCHR Res 1998/33 ‘Question of the Realization in all Countries of the Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, and study of special problems which the developing countries face in their efforts to 
achieve these human rights’ (17 April 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/33, para 6.  
12
 UNCHR Res 2004/72 ‘Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to 
Combat Impunity’ (21 April 2004) UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/72; UNHRC Res 6/14 ‘Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery including its Causes and Consequences’ (28 September 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/6/14; UNHRC Res 
15/21 ‘Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association’ (30 September 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/21; 
UNHRC Res 18/7 ‘Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation & Guarantees on Non-Recurrence’ (29 September 
2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/18/7. 
13
 UNCHR Res 2004/72 ‘Impunity’ (21 April 2004) UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/72. 
14
 UNCHR Res 1999/44 ‘Human Rights of Migrants’ (27 April 1999) UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/44; UNCHR Res 
2000/61 ‘Human Rights Defenders’ (26 April 2000) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2000/61; UNCHR Res 2001/57, 
‘Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People’ (24 April 2001) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2001/57; UNCHR Res 2002/68 ‘People of African Descent’ (25 April 2002) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2002/68; UNCHR Res 2004/110 ‘Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children’ (21 
April 2004) UN Doc E/CN.4/DEC/2004/110; UNCHR Res 2005/79 ‘Minority Issues’ (21 April 2004) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2005/79;  UNHRC Res 15/23 ‘Discrimination Against Women in Law and in Practice’ (1 October 
2010) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/23; UNHRC Res 24/20 ‘The Human Rights of Older Persons’ (27 September 
2013) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/24/20.  
15
 UNCHR Res 1999/44 ‘Human Rights of Migrants’ (27 April 1999) UN Doc E/CN.4/1999/44. 
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States engage with some individual mandate holders. Of course, Global North States are not 
homogenous and there is a broad spectrum in terms of approaches to ESCR and TGR, with 
countries such as Spain and Ireland taking markedly different approaches than for example 
the United States.
16
 Yet it is also clear that ESCR as legal rights are still criticised by some 
Global North States, while some others all but ignore ESCR as requiring legal protection. The 
US is not party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
17
 and, 
while other Global North countries have ratified that treaty, many have adopted a more 
intermediate position towards ESCR than CPR in terms of legal protection and legal 
mechanisms. The majority of Global North States have far fewer ESCR than CPR in their 
national constitutions,
18
 and/or differentiate between the legal status that they afford to ESCR 
and CPR.
19
 .  
The differences between approaches to CPR and ESCR are significant, but they are 
far less pronounced than the differences between those two categories of rights and TGR. 
Some TGR mandates bring into the human rights arena issues that are protected elsewhere, 
for example in relation to environmental law.
20
 However, within the human rights arena TGR 
typically remain at the embryonic stage of development in terms both of legal norms and of 
mechanisms available for protecting and promoting those rights.
21
 As we will see below, 
TGR generally are criticised by Global North States, many of which insist that they divert 
                                                          
16
 ‘For an overview of a range of different national approaches, including those of a number of Gobal North 
States, see M Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
Law (CUP 2008); F. Coomans, (ed), Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights, Experiences from Domestic 
Systems (Intersentia, 2006). 
17
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
18
 Even where Western governments have taken a position that supports the equal status and importance of 
ESCR in terms of their statements at the international level, they frequently fail to take legislative, 
administrative or judicial measures that would be entailed by a meaningful recognition and acceptable of ESCR 
as human rights or to provide effective redress for alleged violations of those rights, whether at the domestic or 
international level.  For example, from the international perspective, at the time of writing only three Western 
democracies – Spain, Portugal and Slovakia – have ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. The following 
databases demonstrate that there is greater constitutional protection of CPR than ESCR: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/ and http://www.tiesr.org/data_cr.html accessed 3 April 2016. 
19
 For more on this point, see M Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence Emerging Trends in International 
and Comparative Law (CUP 2008). 
20
 D Shelton, ‘Environmental Rights’ in P Alston (ed), People’s Rights (OUP 2001) 194. Note that the only 
international human rights treaty to make explicit reference to aspects of environmental protection is the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 
1990) 1577 UNTS 3, art 24 (UNGA, ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’, 20 November 1989, UNTS vol 
1577, 3). 
21
 See DN Sharp ‘Re-Appraising the Significance of “Third-Generation” Rights in a Globalized World’ (2015) 
available for download at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2635236> 8–10, discussing the 
vague and broad content of TGR. 
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resources away from other thematic areas, and also because arguably they focus on issue 
areas that are better addressed outside of the human rights system.
22
 
In contrast, where it comes to international human rights law mechanisms that focus 
on vulnerable groups, Global North States generally support their creation and operation as 
we will see below. Although the essence of human rights being universal is that they apply 
equally to all persons irrespective of an individual’s characteristics, it is clear that the ideals 
of universality do not always translate into practice where it comes to vulnerable groups. The 
problem, of course, is that the vulnerability of each category of people usually relates to 
national policies or approaches to those groups, and therefore different States have been 
resistant to focus on those groups that require the most assistance within their own territories. 
Although historically those mechanisms have focussed largely on groups that Global North 
States recognise as vulnerable, such as women, children and minorities, there have been more 
recent attempts to create mechanisms that move beyond those approaches – for example on 
Peasants
23
 – that have not been supported by many of those countries. 
 
B. Global North States and different types of mandates 
Special Procedures’ legitimacy depends on all types of States being examined on all types of 
rights in a proportionate and even-handed manner. Yet when it comes to some Global North 
States it appears that the increase in mandates on ESCR, TGR
24
 and vulnerable groups has 
impacted negatively upon those countries accepting the system’s universality in terms of 
visits, reports and recommendations about human rights issues within their own territories. It 
is interesting to note the different types of resistance from different countries. One form of 
resistance, and indeed a key one, is through voting against the creation or renewal of a 
mandate. That sends a strong message about whether a State agrees that legal mechanisms are 
appropriate to protect or promote a right. When mandates are created or renewed, a resolution 
is tabled at the UN’s principal human rights body – previously the Commission on Human 
                                                          
22
 See L Richardson, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (and Beyond) in the UN Human Rights Council’ 
(2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 1, 21–22 discussing TGR and responses from HRC members. 
23
 For a detailed discussion of peasants’ rights and of various responses to those rights, see C Golay, ‘Legal 
Reflections on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas – background paper prepared 
for the first session of the working group on the rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas’ 
(Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 15–19 July 2013) 
<www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGPleasants/Golay.pdf> accessed 3 April 2016.   
24
 For more on the increase in the number of mandates, see Freedman and Mchangama (n 2) and M Limon and 
Hilary Power, ‘History of the United Nations Special Procedures Mechanism: Origins, Evolution and Reform’ 
(2014, Universal Rights Group), Annex I, available at http://www.universal-rights.org/urg-policy-
reports/history-of-the-united-nations-special-procedures-mechanism-origins-evolution-and-reform/ accessed 3 
April 2016. 
.  
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Rights (CHR) and currently the Human Rights Council (HRC). States members of the body 
then vote either for or against the resolution or abstain from voting. Countries not members of 
the body may signal their support through sponsoring the resolution but are not able to vote 
on whether or not it passes.  
The second form of resistance comes later in terms of how States respond to and 
engage with mandate holders, including accepting, rejecting or ignoring visit requests, 
providing unfettered access for fact-finding, responding to communications regarding 
individual complaints, and public responses to mandate holders within both the national and 
international arenas. In what follows we will explore Global North States’ responses – which 
are not always homogenous – to the creation and renewal of mandates in order to provide a 
general map of the differences and similarities of those States’ approaches to different types 
of mandates. That is crucial for understanding how and why some Global North States have 
pushed-back against some mandate holders, which will be explored in subsequent sections. 
Global North States typically have not been resistant to the civil and political rights 
(CPR) mandates because those map onto their understandings of what constitutes legal rights 
in terms of justiciability and international legal mechanisms. As a result, CPR mandates are 
not as politically controversial as ESCR mandates from the perspective of many Global North 
States. CPR mandate holders explore issues relating mostly to law and its implementation 
through the justice system.  
Where it comes to ESCR mandates most Global North States have voted for their 
creation and renewal, particularly European Union member States despite there being some 
divergence of opinion internally between those countries as we will see. However, the 
notable exception is the US, which when it was a member of the CHR voted against the 
creation of the mandates on Extreme Poverty (1998)
25
 and on the Right to Food (2000).
26
 In 
2000, the Czech Republic and Latvia abstained in the vote,
27
 neither of which were members 
of the European Union at the time. In contrast, all EU Member States that sat at the CHR in 
2000 voted for the creation of the mandate.
28
 None of the ESCR mandates have required a 
vote for their renewal, demonstrating that Global North States have accepted the mandates as 
mechanisms whose existence they do not resist. It is also interesting to note that the mandates 
                                                          
25
 UNCHR Res 1998/25 ‘Human Rights and Extreme Poverty’ (17 April 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/1998/25. 
26
 UNCHR Res 2000/10 ‘The Right to Food’ (17 April 2000) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2000/10. 
27
 ibid. 
28
 Including France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden, Spain and the UK. 
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on Adequate Housing (2000),
29
 Safe Drinking Water (2008),
30
 and Cultural Rights (2009)
31
 
did not require a vote for the initial resolutions that created them, signifying the level of 
acceptance for those mandates.  
In contrast to the creation and renewal of ESCR mandates, resolutions on TGR 
mandates have shown significant divergence between the Global North and South and, 
indeed, occasionally between Global North States themselves. Special Procedures mandates 
have been a key vehicle for developing TGR but this has led those mandates to be framed in 
broad terms in order to enable mandate holders to assist with developing normative content. 
The broader the mandate, the less likely it is to be supported by Global North countries.
32
 All 
Global North States members of the CHR in 2000
33
 voted against the mandate on Foreign 
Debt,
34
 and have continued to call for a vote and then vote against the resolution each time 
the mandate has been renewed. The same has occurred in relation to International Solidarity 
(2005)
35
 and its renewals, as well as Equitable and Democratic Order (2011)
36
 and its 
renewal. Objections raised by Global North States, ranging from Ireland and Spain to the US 
and the UK, centre upon the vagueness of the mandates and whether they are appropriately 
placed within the human rights system and within a legal mechanism for protection and 
promotion. Similar issues were raised in terms of mandate on Toxic Waste (1995)
37
 when all 
Global North States members of the CHR
38
 voted against its creation. However, subsequent 
renewals of the mandate passed without a vote, in part owing to the first mandate holder 
providing normative content to the mandate and demonstrating how and why it belongs 
within the human rights system. The 2012 mandate on a Clean Environment passed without a 
                                                          
29
 UNCHR Res 2000/9 ‘Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate 
Standard of Living’ (17 April 2009) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2000/9. 
30
 UNHRC Res 7/22 ‘Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation’ (28 March 2008) UN 
Doc A/HRC/RES/7/22. 
31
 UNHRC Res 10/23 ‘Independent Expert in the Field of Cultural Rights’ (26 March 2009) UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/10/23. 
32
 Freedman and Mchangama (n 2).  
33
 Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, the UK and the US. 
34
 UNCHR Res 2000/82 ‘Effects of Structural Adjustment Policies and Foreign Debt on the Full Enjoyment of 
All Human Rights, particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (26 April 2000) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2000/82.   
35
 UNCHR Res 2005/55 ‘Human Rights and International Solidarity’ (20 April 2006) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/RES/2005/55. 
36
 UNHRC Res 18/6 ‘Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order’ (29 September 2011) UN 
Doc A/HRC/RES/18/6. 
37
 UNCHR Res 1995/81 ‘Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement and Dumping of Toxic and Dangerous 
Products and Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human Rights’ (8 March 1995) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/1995/81. 
38
 Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Republic of Korea, Romania, the UK and the US. 
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vote
39
 and without any objection from Global North States member of the HRC, not least 
because the link between realisation of human rights and the environment has now been 
established. The mandate that caused divergence between Global North States, however, was 
on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Business
40
 (2005):
41
 on the one hand 
Australia, South Africa and the US voted against that mandate, on the other it was supported 
by other Global North States not only voting for its creation but some of whom sponsored the 
resolution.
42
  
In terms of vulnerable groups, Global North States have tended to vote in favour of 
resolutions creating these mandates, including on Discrimination Against Women in Law and 
Practice (2012),
43
 Human Rights Defenders (2000),
44
 Human Trafficking (2004),
45
 and 
Indigenous People.
46
 When thinking about States voting against vulnerable group mandates 
that will significantly impact national policies and laws, it is interesting to note, that China, 
Cuba and Rwanda all voted against the creation of the mandate on Human Rights 
Defenders.
47
 It is noteworthy that Global North States members of the CHR
48
 all voted 
against the creation of the mandate on people of African Descent (2002),
49
 with the exception 
of Japan which abstained. That mandate formed part of the drive to give effect to the Durban 
Declaration and Programme of Action (2001)
50
 and which was politically contentious and 
divisive between the Global North and South,
51
 and of course the issue reparations for the 
transatlantic slave trade is one that threatened significant impact upon many Global North 
                                                          
39
 UNHRC Res 19/10 ‘Human Rights and the Environment’ (19 April 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/19/10. 
40
 This can be considered to be TGR mandate because it brings into the human rights arena a subject a matter 
that impacts upon human rights rather than focusing on a specific right and because it addresses a subject matter 
that frequently impacts upon collectives or groups of victims. For more on the categorisation of TGR mandates 
see Freedman and Mchangama (n2) 172-173 and Appendix I. 
41
 UNCHR Res 2005/69 ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (20 
April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/69. 
42
 Including Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Norway, Poland, Spain and the 
UK, not all of which were members of the CHR at that time. 
43
 See (n 14) 
44
 ibid. 
45
 ibid. 
46
 ibid. 
47
 ibid. 
48
 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Republic of Korea, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK.  
49
 UNCHR Res 2002/68 ‘Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance’ (25 April 2002) 
UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2002/68.  
50
 ‘Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance’ World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance 
(Durban 31 August–8 September 2001) (2001) UN Doc A/CONF.189/12. 
51
 See eg C Camponovo, ‘Disaster in Durban: The United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial 
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696. 
10 
 
States.
52
 However, the vulnerable group mandate that most affects Global North States within 
their own territories is the one on Migrants. It is noteworthy that to date no Global North 
State has ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (signed in 1990, entered into force 2003),
53
 yet not 
one such State voted against the creation of the mandate on that group in 1999.
54
 Indeed, EU 
States and the US sponsored the resolution creating the mandate on Migrants, and did so 
owing to key changes being made to the text of the originally-tabled draft resolution as those 
changes made the Convention less applicable to the types of migration that occurs into Global 
North States.   
It is clear, therefore, that even when it comes to creating and renewing different types 
of Special Procedures mandates there is significant divergence between Global North and 
Global South States, and indeed divergence even between those countries from the Global 
North. Divergence of opinion relating to mandate creation or renewal are more likely to arise 
vis-à-vis TGR mandates, but also occur in relation to those that focus on specific categories 
of vulnerable groups that impact upon those countries’ domestic policies. Indeed, no Global 
North States hold an ideological position that opposes non-CPR mandates as a matter of 
course. However, as we shall see, when non-CPR mandate holders visit and/or make 
recommendations about Global North States there have been far more instances of resistance 
than might be expected given the general support of those countries for the Special 
Procedures system.  
 
III. Global North States and resistance to scrutiny 
By and large Global North States appear to engage well with mandate holders: they allow a 
large number of visits from mandate holders and frequently can be relied upon to accept visit 
requests.
55
 That level of engagement remains superior to that of countries from the Global 
South, many of which reject or ignore such requests.
56
 However, as we will see below, there 
has been an increasing tendency on the part of some Global North States towards resisting 
mandate holders’ reports and questioning the legitimacy of the visits and recommendations. 
                                                          
52
 See A Bayefsky, ‘The UN World Conference Against Racism: A Racist Anti-Racism Conference’ (2002) 96 
American Society of International Law Proceedings 65, 71 citing resistance among European Union delegates to 
having to pay reparations for slavery. 
53
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Members of Their Families’ (18 December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/158. 
54
 UNCHR Res 1999/44 ‘Human Rights of Migrants’ (26 April 1999) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/1999/44. 
55
 See OHCHR (n 4). The statistics provided by OHCHR also include the number of visit requests that have 
been ignored by States. For more on country visits, see Gaer’s contribution to this volume.  
56
 ibid.  
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While the approach of such States is different from those of States that refuse to allow 
mandate holders to visit their territories insofar as they do not refuse or ignore mandate 
holders’ visit requests, such responses are pernicious both for individual mandates and for the 
system as a whole. Moreover, these responses have not yet been explored or addressed 
extensively within the academy or by UN human rights bodies such as the Human Rights 
Council despite such occurrences becoming increasingly common. 
One important factor to bear in mind when exploring these matters is that mandate 
holders generally request visits to States that present significant problems in relation to the 
thematic right. Therefore, we can posit that those Global North States most accepting of the 
need to protect and promote all types of rights through legal mechanisms are the least likely 
to be visited by mandate holders. In the context of ESCR, mandate holders have visited far 
more Global North States that resist the legal nature of those categories of rights than ones 
that support and implement those rights through legal mechanisms.
57
 That may be because 
countries that use legal mechanisms to uphold ESCR present fewer problems that require 
reports and recommendations, but of course this skews the data when examining the 
relationship between Global North States because mandate holders are more likely to visit 
Global North countries that present more problems in relation to ESCR and that will resist the 
reports and recommendations resulting from the visits.  
ESCR, TGR and vulnerable group mandate holders appear to be critical of Global 
North States in ways that those countries push back against the most, frequently because 
those countries resist the legitimacy of their criticisms and recommendations. Of course there 
are some exceptions to that generalisation, for example when the US refused to allow 
unfettered access to Guantanamo Bay to four CPR mandate holders seeking to conduct a joint 
visit.
58
 However, the US, and Global North States generally, do not question the legitimacy of 
legal mechanisms to protect and promote CPR, but tensions seem to arise where those 
countries consider matters to fall under ‘security’ rather than ‘human rights’ umbrella.59 
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and I Atak, ‘International Migration: Security Concerns and Human Rights Standards’ (2007) 44 Transcultural 
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Resistance to mandate holders’ activities relating to issues that Global North States consider 
security concerns – ranging from the ‘War on Terror’ to irregular migration – appear to 
underpin most instances where a Global North State fails fully to engage with a CPR mandate 
holder.  
Global North States have adopted a similar approach to mandate holders on 
vulnerable groups as they have towards those on CPR. Generally, countries allow those 
mandate holders unfettered access to conduct fact-finding and are responsive and receptive to 
reports and recommendations. However, where they view the vulnerable group mandate as 
examining security concerns rather than human rights, there appears to be greater resistance 
both to the mandate holder’s visit and the report. The clearest example is the mandate on 
Migrants, with Australia refusing to provide assurances to the mandate holder that persons 
communicating with him regarding the treatment of detained foreigners would not be 
subjected to the possibilities of prosecution provided for in the Border Force Act of 2015.
60
 
That refusal was contrary to the 1999 terms of reference for fact-finding missions by Special 
Rapporteurs and the Human Rights Council Resolution on cooperation with the United 
Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights.
61
 But even when a 
country supports a mandate on a vulnerable group it may resist mandate holders reporting on 
issues that it considers ‘security concerns’, as occurred when the mandate holder on Violence 
Against Women was refused full access to female irregular migrants in a UK detention 
centre.
62
 
Resistance to ESCR and TGR mandates when it occurs appears to stem not from the 
security versus human rights debate, but rather from an unwillingness to engage with the 
plausibility that such rights exist as legal rights or that, if they do, they are being violated by 
government policies.  
To illustrate ways in which this resistance manifests itself, we shall examine three 
case studies: (1) UK and housing; (2) Canada and food; and (3) the EU and migrants. In all 
three instances the mandate holders were looking at human rights concerns that impact upon 
politics and government policies relating to social protection. All of those mandates require 
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the mandate holders to question whether States had discharged their duties or whether they 
had violated the rights with which the mandates are concerned. The policies with which they 
are concerned are ones that are integral to domestic politics and that resonate with voters, 
namely housing and benefits, food security and the rights of migrants (as a vulnerable group). 
One common factor that underscores that point is that, as we will see below, the responses 
seem to have been aimed at the voters reading or watching the media rather than at the 
international human rights community. Indeed, as will become evident, many of those 
responses fail to engage adequately or at all with the substance of the mandate holders’ 
reports, or the human rights concerns raised by those experts, but rather seek to undermine 
the legitimacy of their visits or their credentials.  
 
A.  UK and housing 
In 2013 the UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an 
Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-Discrimination in this Context,
63
 
Raquel Rolnik, visited the UK and as part of her findings and recommendations on a range of 
issues she commented on the spare-room subsidy
64
 and criticised the UK for human rights 
violations.
65
 She commented on the Coalition Government’s policy to charge council house 
tenants for supposedly under-occupying homes based on numbers of residents and 
bedrooms.
66
 Rolnik claimed that the policy could violate the right to adequate housing, not 
least owing to the shortage of one and two bedroom council housing. She also noted that the 
subsidy may impact the realisation of other rights, particularly where people were forced to 
choose between housing, food and heating.
67
  
It is important to understand why Rolnik undertook a visit to the UK and why she 
focussed on the Government’s ‘spare room subsidy’ policy. Rolnik is a Brazilian urban 
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planner and architect who brought her professional experience to bear not only on the 
substance of her reports but also in the range of audiences that she addressed.
68
 Rolnik’s 
tenure began in 2008 and finished in 2014, thus beginning at the time of the global financial 
crisis. That event was a central theme in Rolnik’s work as a mandate holder: she focussed 
two of her reports on the impact on housing of the global financial crisis and related issues,
69
 
as well as undertaking related missions to the World Bank.
70
  As Hohmann states, these 
aspects of Rolnik’s work emphasised her ‘demands to imagine housing and land within a 
fundamentally different paradigm: as social and public goods, not as financial instruments or 
commodified market assets’.71 Throughout her time as Special Rapporteur, Rolnik focussed 
on States and governments’ role in the right to adequate housing, particularly in relation to 
policies and interventions, as well as the use of housing as a financial asset. Indeed, her first 
report detailed the ‘fundamental flaws in current economic and housing policies’72 and the 
‘inability of market mechanisms to provide adequate and affordable housing for all’73 and the 
discriminatory aspect of neo-liberal housing policies.
74
  
The Special Rapporteur used a human rights lens to view the UK spare room subsidy, 
as per the terms of her mandate. Although she undertook significant fact-finding, the 
information that she shared and her recommendations did not cover ground that had not 
already been discussed in the UK media
75
 (although her rights-based stance was a new aspect 
that added to the debate). Indeed, her comments and recommendations were far less critical 
than some elements of the UK press and civil society previously had been about the policy. 
But Rolnik’s comments hit a raw nerve with the Government. Grant Shapps, the 
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Conservative Party Chairman, sent a letter of complaint to the United Nations, demanding an 
apology and an explanation for her comments.
76
 He accused Rolnik of bias and political 
motives.
77
 He questioned why she had visited the UK rather than focussing her efforts on 
graver situations elsewhere in the world.
78
 Furthermore, he accused her of conducting her 
fact-finding mission without permission.
79
 That reaction was followed by personal attacks 
from other Government officials – for example, Conservative Party Member of Parliament, 
Stuart Jackson, called Rolnik a ‘Loopy Brazilian Leftie’80 – and from centre-right elements of 
the media. 
Mandate holders are not allowed to visit a country without prior permission; and even 
though the UK has issued a standing invitation to all Special Procedures mandate holders, if 
one wants to visit s/he must liaise with the government before undertaking a mission to that 
country. Rolnik’s visit to the UK, then, was not an intrusion but was a carefully planned and 
coordinated visit to which the UK Government had consented and helped organise. Her focus 
on the spare room subsidy was in line with her thematic interests, reports and 
recommendations throughout her mandate. And the question of whether ESCR bind 
governments in terms of their policies is one that has long-been answered in the affirmative
81
 
in the doctrine and the case law, despite the resistance of States.  
Those initial responses occurred immediately after Rolnik’s visit: so perhaps Shapps 
was badly briefed or perhaps not briefed at all regarding Rolnik’s visit and Special 
Procedures more generally. But those attacks, personal and professional, recurred when 
Rolnik presented her report to the Human Rights Council in February 2014 and at that point 
Government officials could no longer claim to have been unaware of how and why the visit 
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took place.
82
 Although the UK’s delegates to the Human Rights Council in Geneva adopted a 
respectful, albeit critical, stance towards Rolnik’s report in the interactive dialogue following 
her presentation, the UK Government continued to attack Rolnik at home. Kris Hopkins, who 
was the Conservative Party’s Housing Minister at that time, dismissed Rolnik’s report as a 
‘Marxist diatribe’,83 a comment that fed directly into the ongoing political discussions at that 
time surrounding the austerity agenda and the ‘welfare reform’ at the heart of the 
Government’s programme. The response of the Conservative Party, which drove those 
agendas within the Coalition Government, demonstrated the level to which Rolnik’s report 
and recommendations hit home with ‘uncomfortable truths’ about its policies on welfare and 
how the reaction to her report was instrumentalised to mobilise the electorate.
84
  
 
B. Canada and food 
In 2012 the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, visited 
Canada
85
 and in particular focussed on access to healthy food and on food security for the 
poor and for vulnerable or minority groups. His report and recommendations emphasised, 
amongst others, the increasing financial and developmental inequality in Canada
86
 and the 
resulting impact upon the right to food.
87
 De Schutter focussed on social policies, particularly 
social assistance benefits and the minimum wage, as well as the rising costs of basic 
necessities, including food, when addressing issues of accessibility, availability and 
affordability and quality of food within the country. His report criticised government policies 
and inaction to combat poor nutrition that manifests in malnutrition, obesity, and lack of food 
security particularly in relation to healthy food.
88
 In particular, he focussed upon the right to 
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food and indigenous populations,
89
 which was a particular point of contention for Canada 
given its domestic record in terms of treatment of those populations.
90
  
De Schutter was appointed as mandate holder in 2008 and his tenure ran until 2014. 
Throughout his tenure, de Schutter focussed on the need for diverse, culturally-acceptable 
foods, supporting local food production, sustaining soil and water resources, and raising food 
security rather than ‘the one-dimensional quest to produce more food’.91 His final annual 
report focussed on local and national strategies for food security, the availability of nutritious 
food rather than calorie consumption and sustainable production and consumption,
92
 
demonstrating his key interests in those themes during his tenure. In particular, and in 
keeping with his work as mandate holder, de Schutter sought to situate the right to food 
within a broader framework of poverty reduction, development and broader financial 
security.
93
 De Schutter conducted visits to countries from the Global South and Global North, 
including Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, China, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mexico, South Africa, 
Syria, as well as to institutions such as the World Trade Organisation. The mission to Canada 
was his first to a Global North State but the themes that he focussed upon were ones that had 
roots in his previous country-specific and annual reports as well as in his previous 
scholarship. It is important to understand that de Schutter, a legal scholar specialising in 
economic and social rights, used his tenure as mandate holder to develop the way that the 
right to food is understood and to situate it within the broader economic, social and cultural 
contexts.      
When de Schutter visited and reported on Canada, he emphasised issues relating to 
food policies, the adequacy and accessibility of food and issues relating to development and 
sustainability.
94
 He focussed in particular on indigenous populations, and on the issue of 
malnutrition, obesity and poverty.
95
 Those thematic issues were in line with his previous 
annual and country-specific reports throughout his tenure. He also highlighted the 
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weaknesses in Canada’s legal framework for ESCR generally,96 contrasting those 
deficiencies with the country’s ‘impressive’ record on CPR.97 
De Schutter’s report and his recommendations were poorly-received by Canada’s 
government, and in particular the Government resisted the idea that legal mechanisms are 
able to investigate and uphold ESCR generally and the right to food specifically within its 
territory. The reaction from Canada’s Government challenged the legitimacy of the visit, the 
report and the mandate holder. Systematically calling the Special Rapporteur the ‘UN hunger 
specialist’ and questioning the purpose of the visit by claiming that ‘there’s no hunger in 
Canada’,98 Immigration Minister Jason Kenney stated: ‘It would be our hope that the 
contributions we make to the United Nations are used to help starving people in developing 
countries, not to give lectures to wealthy and developed countries like Canada. And I think 
this is a discredit to the United Nations’.99 Health Minister Leona Aglukkaq called de 
Schutter ‘ill-informed’ and ‘patronising’,100 alleging that the mandate holder had failed 
adequately to engage with or understand indigenous populations during his visit.  
Those reactions demonstrate failures to engage with the substance of the report. The 
Government Ministers focussed their remarks on de Schutter rather than on the 
recommendations that he proposed. Indeed, it appears that Minister Kenney in particular was 
aiming his remarks towards the Canadian public, using the Special Rapporteur as a political 
ploy rather than treating him as an interlocutor. More than 130 organisations and 400 
individuals signed a letter written by Amnesty Canada to then Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper, expressing deep concern about the ‘unprecedented attacks on [de Schutter’s] integrity 
and professionalism’ in the House of Commons and in the media.101 The letter noted that 
Government ministers had treated other mandate holders in a similar manner in previous 
months, including attacks on James Anaya, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in December 2011.
102
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When criticised, de Schutter responded that ‘his role is to help countries identify blind 
spots in public policies that would be easier to ignore — and that he didn't see why he should 
mince his words’.103 He emphasised that most of his visits are to developing countries, but he 
insisted that there remains a need to report on the wealthiest States and pointed to the 
‘desperate situation’ of the poorest in Canada including one million First Nations people and 
55,000 Inuit.
104
 Yet, despite de Schutter’s response and those of human rights actors, 
Canada’s government continued to question the legitimacy of the mandate holder and of the 
country-visit and report. 
In March 2013 de Schutter presented his report to the Human Rights Council and 
during the interactive dialogue that ensued Canada again criticised ‘the approach which the 
Special Rapporteur had taken in an attempt to assess Canadian laws’ arguing that he had 
exceeded his mandate by focusing on issues such as indigenous peoples.
105
 Sandeep Prasad, 
Executive Director of Action Canada for Population and Development, observed that ‘the 
Canadian government continued its pattern of defensiveness towards legitimate human rights 
scrutiny by UN mechanisms instead of making a clear commitment to serious consideration 
and implementation of those recommendations’.106  
  
C. EU and migrants 
The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants was created in 
1999
107
 and continues to operate 14 years later. Francois Crépeau’s tenure as mandate holder 
began in 2011 and will finish in 2017. He is a legal scholar who specialises in migration 
control mechanisms, the rights of foreigners, the interfaces between security and migration, 
and between the Rule of Law and globalisation. Those are themes that have been central in 
his reports and activities as mandate holder.
108
 His tenure is taking place during the time 
                                                          
103
 L Payton, ‘UN official sparks debate over Canadian food security’ (CBC News, 16 May 2012) 
<www.cbc.ca/news/politics/un-official-sparks-debate-over-canadian-food-security-1.1130281> accessed 3 April 
2016. 
104
 ibid. 
105
 OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council holds Interactive dialogue with Experts on the Right to Food and the Right 
to Adequate Housing’ (OHCHR, 4 March 2013 
<www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13071&LangID=E> accessed 3 April 
2016. 
106
 Amnesty International, ‘Canada – UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food presents his report’ (Amnesty 
International, 4 March 2013) <www.amnesty.ca/news/news-releases/canada-un-special-rapporteur-on-the-right-
to-food-presents-his-report> accessed 3 April 2016. 
107
 UNCHR Res 1999/44 ‘Human Rights of Migrants’ (27 April 1999) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/1999/44. 
108
 OHCHR, ‘Annual Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants’ 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/SRMigrants/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx> accessed 3 April 2016.   
20 
 
when migration to Europe, via boats from North Africa and the Middle East, grew 
exponentially and as such he focussed upon that growing and worsening humanitarian crisis. 
Crépeau, in his capacity as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human 
Rights of Migrants, spent his first year as mandate holder visiting Albania, Greece,
109
 Italy,
110
 
Tunisia
111
 and Turkey.
112
 He was particularly concerned to find out about and provide 
recommendations on the points of departure and arrival for irregular migrants seeking to 
enter Europe. He presented his first report on European border policies to the UN Human 
Rights Council in June 2013. 
113
  Having spent a year investigating the rights of migrants in 
that region, Crépeau offered a range of recommendations. Criticising the focus on security 
concerns, he called for the EU and its Member States to adopt a human rights-based approach 
to migration.
114
  
At the interactive dialogue at the Human Rights Council, during which the mandate 
holder publicly presents his or her report and receives questions and comments from States 
members or observers at the body, country after country from across the world repeated the 
fundamental necessity of a human rights-based approach to migration.
115
 However, EU 
countries all but failed to engage with the Special Rapporteur during those discussions. 
Portugal and Montenegro did mention his report but ignored the main thrust of his arguments. 
Greece and Italy, which had been visited by Crépeau when he was investigating the EU’s 
external borders, welcomed the analysis that showed how it was impossible for them to guard 
the external borders of the EU on their own, but sought to downplay the egregious violations 
of migrants’ rights, including detention without charge and lack of access to legal services 
and healthcare. All other EU Member States studiously avoided mentioning Crépeau’s 
report.
116
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Only the EU as an institution provided a considered response, accepting a number of 
recommendations.
117
 However, in this very sensitive field, States still have the final political 
word, in particular through the role of the European Council, and the response of the EU 
reflected the divisions among European States and the little leeway that the European 
institutions in Brussels have. 
At the express request of the Human Rights Council following the migration tragedies 
in the Mediterranean during the summer of 2014, a follow-up report was presented in June 
2015.
118
 This report emphasised that European States should organise mobility rather than 
resist it, as repression of irregular migration only increases the precariousness of the migrants 
and therefore entrenches the power of smuggling rings and unscrupulous employers. It 
highlighted the futility of ‘fighting the smugglers’ as long as there would be a market for 
mobility services across borders and this market was not operated by the States themselves:  
the paradox is that States have lost the control of the border by insisting on the closure of the 
border.
119
 This was not a message that most European politicians were ready to hear or adopt, 
as, on their domestic political stage, they were generally expected to deliver a strong anti-
immigration message, emphasising territorial sovereignty, border closures and repression. 
The interactive dialogue at the Human Rights Council again reflected those States’ dismissal 
of Crépeau’s recommendations.120 
 
D. Observations 
Based on the analysis of the three case studies, the resounding message from these reactions 
is that the Global North States in question either thought that the mandate holders were 
interfering with domestic political matters or were concerned about why they have received 
visits when the experts could have gone to other countries with (in their view) far more acute 
problems. Rather than engaging with or addressing mandate holders’ concerns, governments 
choose either to react negatively or to avoid discussing the criticisms raised in the reports.  
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Those responses to Special Procedures mandate holders may be compared with 
Global North States’ engagement with other international human rights actors – for instance, 
UN treaty bodies.
121
 While some countries submit their reports late,
122
 ignore interim 
measures
123
 or fail to implement the quasi-judicial rulings from those bodies, the 
governments do not attack the institutions or the individual experts that sit on them. 
The question, then, must be why some Global North States respond to Special 
Procedures in a manner that does not occur in relation to other international human rights 
actors. One significant factor may be the nature of the mechanisms. Global North States seem 
to respond better, or at least more respectfully, towards judicial and quasi-judicial bodies than 
to Special Procedures whose mandates are broader than judicial functions. Secondly, some 
Global North States seemingly respond better to mechanisms to which they have consented 
through ratification of treaties than to Special Procedures which, despite visit requests 
needing to be accepted, are able to discuss publicly discuss publicly any country’s human 
rights record, with or without its consent.
124
 Thirdly, some Global North States seem to prefer 
when reports are produced by institutions (such as treaty bodies or international judicial 
mechanisms), where geographical composition is ‘balanced’ and language is checked, rather 
than by individual experts whose behaviour may be less predictable and the language used in 
their reports may be of a more personal format. Fourthly, the very public pronouncements of 
mandate holders’ findings in press conferences at the conclusion of a visit is markedly 
different to the formal reporting of judicial and quasi-judicial rulings, and the information is 
reported far more widely in the domestic media – a fact that can be expected to affect the 
reaction of the States visited. Those four factors in turn are important when turning to explore 
possible motivations behind those reactions and the impact that they have on the Special 
Procedures system. 
                                                          
121
 See eg UN High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty 
Body System’ (26 June 2012) UN Doc A/66/860, setting out States’ responses to treaty bodies generally. More 
broadly regarding the need for reform to the treaty bodies and State responses to that process, see C Broecker 
and M O’Flaherty, ‘The Outcome of the General Assembly’s Treaty Body Strengthening Process: An Important 
Milestone on a Longer Journey’ (Universal Rights Group 2014) <www.universal-rights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/URG_Policy_Brief_web_pge_by_pge_hd.pdf> accessed 3 April 2016.  
122
 See eg A Bayefsy, The UN Human Rights Treaty System: Universality at the Crossroads (Transnational 
Publishers, 2001) <www.bayefsky.com/report/finalreport.pdf> accessed 3 April 2016, setting out the status of 
State reporting and responses to communications.  
123
 There are many examples of this, although the most widely referenced of course is the US failure to uphold 
interim measures issued in relation to death penalty cases. 
124
 There are many articles that discuss state engagement with and the impact of treaty bodies using different 
methodologies such as submission of periodic reports or responses to concluding observations. Some 
noteworthy examples include: A Bayefsky (n 122); P Alston and J Crawford (eds), The Future of Human Rights 
Treaty Monitoring (CUP, 2000); and C Heyns and F Viljoen, ‘The impact of the United Nations human rights 
treaties on the domestic level’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly, 483-535. 
23 
 
 
IV. Global North motivations 
The difference is stark between what Global North governments say about human rights 
across the world and how they respond to reports about their own records. While some 
resistance to any criticism is to be expected, the responses detailed in the preceding section 
illustrate that some Global North countries’ reactions to some ESCR and vulnerable group 
mandates seek to undermine the credibility of individual mandate holders. In turn this can be 
expected to impact on the system more broadly. Where it comes to human rights elsewhere, 
including ESCR and vulnerable groups, those governments adopt an expansive position that 
such rights are good things and that all persons ought to have them implemented and realised. 
This is evidenced by those governments having voted in favour of the mandates that then 
criticise them and by those governments – at the Human Rights Council – encouraging other 
countries to respond to visit requests and communications from those mandate holders. When 
it comes to their own domestic records, those issues become political and involve domestic 
discussions with voters.  
In our view, there are two key reasons for this disparity and for how those States 
respond to mandate holders’ reports. First, when a report criticises how government policies 
affect human rights the reaction of the Global North States discussed in the case studies 
above suggest that such States typically view this as interference with domestic concerns and 
react in a way that is speaking to the electorate rather than to the mandate holders. Secondly, 
those States look at egregious abuses elsewhere and question why they are being visited and 
criticised, pointing to worse abuses elsewhere – a reaction that occurs owing to Global North 
countries seeing themselves as ‘being the good guys’, placed on a human rights pedestal.125 
A structural feature of electoral democracies is that politicians react to political 
incentive, and therefore focus on what they perceive is the desire of their electorate: their 
political survival is at stake Therefore, where there is a conflict between a populist discourse 
and a legal human rights obligation, politicians are likely to speak to the populist stance or, at 
best, to remain silent, rather than damage their relationship with the electorate and risk their 
political future.  
Moreover, in the past 20 years, despite progress in human rights doctrine and case 
law, one can observe an increasing resistance towards the independent oversight mechanisms 
which were established in the preceding era. We have seen very populist reactions when 
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courts, tribunals, environmental impact assessment mechanisms, human rights commissions 
or ombudspersons have criticised the measures taken by governments, especially in the 
security and anti-terrorism fields.  
When it comes to human rights issues and international law, especially as it relates to 
the current security agenda (and much has been ‘securitised’ in government policies: anti-
terrorism laws are now applied to environmental groups protesting the construction of 
infrastructures such as pipelines), politicians are increasingly becoming involved from the 
outset and being dismissive of the few independent and expert bodies that remain within the 
international arena. This makes it even more difficult than previously to get States to engage 
in discussions about abuses within their jurisdiction. 
Politicians frequently resort to ‘speech acts’ when there is no easy way to measure the 
results of their actions. The most common speech act is changing the law. If a problem arises, 
the relevant minister will announce a change in the law. The fact that there is precious little 
way to measure the impact of the change is arguably precisely why they favour this 
technique. A good example of this is the ‘fight’ against irregular migration: most States do 
not have statistics, nor official estimates of the undocumented population. Quite often, when 
a new smuggling operation is uncovered, the minister will announce a change in the law, 
although everyone knows that measuring the results of the change will be difficult or 
impossible.   
Another example of politicians’ speech acts is the outright criticism of the mandate 
holders’ reports, without engaging on the content of the analysis or the recommendations. 
Politicians will easily argue that (a) other countries require more attention than they do; (b) 
the objects of the reports are not human rights concerns or at least are not the concern of UN 
human rights mechanisms; (c) mandate holders have gone beyond the scope of their duties; 
and (d) mandate holders’ visits are politicised. We will now explore those arguments as they 
all have some appearance of merit that must be addressed before bringing about a rebuttal. 
 
A. Other countries require more attention 
One reason that Global North States may be obstructive when it comes to mandate holders’ 
reports is that they consider that their human rights records are a cut above those of Global 
South countries. Although those States pay lip-service to universality, in practice they are 
adamant that mandate holders ought to focus their efforts elsewhere. They essentially 
consider that universality does not apply to them because they implement rights to a greater 
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extent than other States. That interpretation of universality focuses on priorities rather than on 
universality being that everyone can be legitimately scrutinised.  
That argument may easily be rebutted. At the heart of international human rights is 
their universal nature. Rights apply to all individuals regardless of race, religion, nationality, 
gender, sexuality or any other characteristic. All countries can improve their human rights 
records. From Sweden to Somalia, from Norway to North Korea, there is a need to protect 
and promote human rights. If the UN only focussed on States with the most acute problems, 
then individuals in more developed countries would be afforded no protection. And, 
crucially, if the UN only focussed on some States or regions, then the legitimacy of the 
Special Procedures system – based on its universality – would wholly be undermined. 
 
B. These are not human rights, or UN mechanisms’, concerns 
The argument about whether ESCR, TGR and some vulnerable groups fall within 
international human rights law and its mechanisms is a return to the issue of ideologies. As 
set out in Section 2, many Global North States afford lesser legal protection to ESCR and 
TGR than to CPR. Despite many of those States formally committing to the principle of 
interdependence and indivisibility of rights, there is a continuing ideological divide regarding 
whether ESCR and TGR rights are legal or whether they are political matters which should 
not be justiciable before courts or tribunals, and thus better left to the expert appreciation of 
politicians and civil servants.  
Of course, those arguments are well-worn and have long been rebutted within the 
international human rights law arena and yet are invoked by State representatives that have 
little or no expertise in this subject. Both CPR and ESCR require States to take positive steps 
to ensure that the rights are implemented and realised. Both CPR and ESCR are justiciable, 
and therefore may be addressed by legal mechanisms as the case law of several constitutional 
or supreme courts attest. Both CPR and ESCR contain issues that are political but the role of 
courts, tribunals and other human rights enforcement mechanisms remains to ensure that 
standards and practices remain within the bounds of the human rights framework. The 
artificial distinctions between these types of rights have comprehensively been dealt with at 
conceptual level, yet they are wheeled out by politicians and government representatives 
when policies are challenged or examined by mandate holders, if it is deemed politically 
beneficial to do so.  
 
C. Mandate holders have gone outside of the scope of their mandates 
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The arguments that mandate holders have gone outside of the scope of their mandates or have 
visited without permission demonstrate a fundamental lack of knowledge and understanding 
of how such visits are conducted. Mandate holders may only visit a country if that State 
formally agrees to a visit request. Any visit requires a great deal of coordination with the 
country’s government in order to set up meetings with ministers, government departments, 
civil servants, national human rights institutions, citizens and many other actors. It is never 
the case that a Special Rapporteur just turns up unannounced. Ample opportunities exist for a 
country either tacitly or expressly to block a visit. Indeed, many countries have blocked 
visits.
126
 Some have simply ignored requests to coordinate visits; others have refused to issue 
visas; while some States have failed to comply with SP mandate holders’ terms of reference 
by blocking access to State and non-state actors.  
Global North States are correctly commended for almost always accepting mandate 
holders’ visit requests. Those countries typically, with few exceptions, allow mandate holders 
to have free and unfettered access to conduct fact-finding as part of those missions. Yet, 
when they accuse experts of going beyond their mandates, government representatives 
undermine the credibility and legitimacy of mandate holders in terms of their other country-
specific or, indeed, thematic reports. By resisting criticisms of their own domestic human 
rights records, Global North countries lay the foundations for other countries – particularly 
known human rights abusers – to do the same.  
 
D. Visits are politicised 
The final argument that must be addressed is whether mandate holders’ visits are politicised. 
Proportionately, there is a high percentage of visits to Global North States compared with 
Global South countries. It must first be borne in mind that many Global South States do not 
have standing invitations, or, even if they do, they refuse visits. Global North States do accept 
all invitations and therefore bear a disproportionate burden in terms of visits. Those countries 
represent 75 per cent of the world’s wealth and less than 20 per cent of the world’s 
population, and they approximately shoulder between one third and one half of mandate 
holders’ visits. It is to the credit of those States that they receive so many mandate holders.  
At the same time, the reports frequently provide best practices to which other 
countries may refer and implement. They also provide crucial information-sharing and fact-
finding to be used by civil society and other actors in other States. Moreover, and of 
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particular importance, by conducting visits to Global North countries, mandate holders are 
able to counter the loud and increasingly-voiced mantra that UN human rights mechanisms, 
and indeed international human rights law more generally, is a ‘neo-colonial tool of 
oppression’127 used by the Global North against the Global South.  
 
V. Moving forward    
The point of this chapter has been to expose the negative ways in which some Global North 
States respond to some Special Procedures mandate holders, and the forms that such 
responses take. Our aim has been to highlight and analyse this issue in order for it to be 
addressed so that Special Procedures can be strengthened and not undermined. Questions 
must be asked as to whether Global North States’ engagement with Special Procedures, 
through allowing mandate holders to visit, is undermined when they criticise or sometimes 
altogether ignore a report and its recommendations by failing to engage with the substance of 
mandate holders’ conclusions and suggestions. Indeed, it could be said that there is little 
practical difference – other than the information-sharing aspect – between the way those 
States engage with mandate holders and countries that simply refuse to allow mandate 
holders to visit. After all, governments change while reports remain, and what has been 
criticised by the government of the day may become the doctrine of a future government. 
Conclusions that can be drawn – prior to further qualitative and quantitative research 
being undertaken on this topic – point towards the central importance of these types of visits 
to and reports on Global North States. The heavy criticism of the reports considered in this 
chapter can be interpreted as a sign that the mandate holders have touched upon nerves that 
already are raw. The reports highlight and emphasise crucial human rights issues that those 
governments devote significant time and resources to presenting as matters that fall within 
policy parameters rather than ones that require legal mechanisms for their protection. The 
reports also provide crucial resources to civil society organisations, grassroots activists and 
legal practitioners, and are picked up on by other international human rights mechanisms 
which use the reports and recommendations as a basis for questioning and probing States as 
well as focusing on specific issues highlighted by SP mandate holders. Lastly, the media has 
become more aware of and more engaged with SP mandate holders as a direct result of 
governmental outbursts and negative responses to certain visits and reports, thus ensuring 
greater interest and dissemination of mandate holders’ work.    
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